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Abstract 
We develop a location analysis spatial model of firms’ competition in multi-
characteristics space, where consumers’ opinions about the firms’ products are 
distributed on multilayered networks. Firms do not compete on price but only on 
location upon the products’ multi-characteristics space, and they aim to attract the 
maximum number of consumers. Boundedly rational consumers have distinct ideal 
points/tastes over the possible available firm locations but, crucially, they are affected 
by the opinions of their neighbors. Our central argument is that the consolidation of a 
dense underlying consumers’ opinion network is the key for the firm to enlarge its 
market-share. Proposing a dynamic agent-based analysis on firms’ location choice we 
characterize multi-dimensional product differentiation competition as adaptive learning 
by firms’ managers and we argue that such a complex systems approach advances the 
analysis in alternative ways, beyond game-theoretic calculations.  
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1.  Introduction 
Product characteristics are typically considered as given when economists study firms’ 
strategies and behavior. But firms in industries with product differentiation actually 
choose the features of their products based on consumers’ preferences. The aim of this 
paper is to suggest a way to understand the complexity in such markets using complex 
networks, which mathematically are described by graph objects. We develop a stylized 
theoretical model to examine the issue of product differentiation in a multi-dimensional 
space with consumers’ choices emerging from consumers’ opinion-based multilayered 
networks. We ask two questions: First, how networks affect market share at the firm 
level? Second, how these networks affect firms’ locations? 
Here we propose a multi-dimensional model of firms’ locational choice in the product-
characteristics space that describes a finite number of firms competing for customers.1 
In this model, consumers have tastes/requirements that place them on their ideal points 
in the multi-characteristics space. For every firm we model the network of consumers’ 
opinions about its product (i.e. for every firm there is a corresponding opinion network 
describing consumers’ opinion about the firm’s product: the nodes represent the 
consumers and a link between two nodes represents their exchange of opinion about 
the corresponding firm’s product), on which (opinion network) a contagion dynamics 
can take place. Consumers are represented by a node on each network and can be active 
only in one of the networks (purchase of one product from one firm) at the end of each 
time period (at the moment of the purchase). Each consumer has also the option not to 
purchase, and in that case she will be inactive in all networks. Before the end of each 
time period, and while the consumers think about the purchase, they are more likely to 
change opinions and examine different options. They have some form of product 
characteristics opinion at the beginning, but as they gain experience and acquire more 
information about the products, their opinion can change, but it stabilizes over time (see 
Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999; West et al., 1996). This “uncertainty reduction” is captured 
by dynamics that slow down until the purchase moment when they become completely 
frozen. These dynamics are implemented in this work with the simulated annealing 
1 Other firm-level models of multidimensional product choice within the agent-based framework are, for 
example, Page and Tassier (2007) and Babutsidze (2015). 
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algorithm. An illustration of a possible final configuration of the described system is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Crucially, consumers are affected by the opinion of their peers, and they tend to be 
active in the network where the majority of their peers are also active.2 In addition, the 
probability of changing their choice decreases as the purchase moment approaches, in 
line with the behavioral literature’s argument that agents change and adapt their 
behavior over time, reflecting both their own learning and changes in their environment 
(Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999). 
Our model would apply also to political competition, as studied by Downs (1957) and 
many others after him. More specifically, it could be perfectly placed within the scope 
of agent-based models described in Laver and Sergenti (2011). However, in this work 
we will stick to the firm affairs’ language.  
Our aim is to provide insights for the role of networks in (a) the firms’ location problem 
and (b) consumers’ choices. We consider consumers’ networks as ‘social’ networks 
since they are based on the social interaction of opinion exchange, without making any 
assumption about the existence of friendship relations, in a Facebook like view of a 
social network. We describe the dynamics of ‘social’ influence in the consumers’ 
networks and we model the uncertainty reduction preceding the consumers’ final choice 
by implementing the simulated annealing algorithm.3 At the end of the simulated 
annealing calculation we have the number of consumers that opt to purchase from each 
firm. This is affected by the average connectivities of the consumers’ opinion networks. 
Hence, we observe “regions” in the average connectivity space where the active nodes 
belonging to some opinion networks with high average connectivity percolate the 
system, while nodes of the remaining opinion networks with lower average 
connectivities are concentrated in disconnected clusters indicating high market share 
inequality. Nevertheless, “regions” where the average connectivity of the consumers’ 
opinion networks are comparable manifest a market that sustains low market share 
inequality.  
2 Two consumers are peers when there is a link between them, i.e. when they exchange opinions. 
3 An early application of the simulated annealing in economics is the work of Goffe et al. (1994) who 
suggested that simulated annealing could be used to optimize the objective function of various 
econometric estimators.  
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From consumers’ perspective, we begin with a very basic idea. Consumers’ decision 
on purchases cannot be different from most other decisions people make in their daily 
lives, in the sense that some process for acquiring information and evaluating it is 
necessary. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study that incorporates 
the role of opinion exchange and processing on a multilayered network, in an attempt 
to shed light on the understanding of how the market-share inequality and competition 
in a multi-characteristics space are affected by the presence of consumers’ interactions. 
Taking into account these multiple layers is crucial, as is shown by the considerable 
current interest in multilayered systems (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Vespignani, 2010; 
Parshani et al., 2011; Baxter et al., 2012; Bashan et al., 2012; Gomez et al., 2013; 
Radicchi and Arenas, 2013; De Domenico et al., 2013; Radicchi, 2014; Garas, 2016). 
On the other hand, to make significant advances in understanding consumers’ 
decisions, we must device a method for studying this process. Such method would allow 
us to observe consumers’ behavior from up close, to dig below the surface and watch 
consumers as they try to exchange information about a myriad of alternative products 
while refining the overwhelmingly volume of information of their multiple 
characteristics. Behavioral decision theory guides the process-oriented, complex 
systems-framework we present in the next sections in an effort to develop a new set of 
measures for studying market proceedings. 
A few papers consider location models where consumers are distributed on a graph. 
Mavronicolas et al. (2008), Feldmann et al. (2009), Nunez and Scarsini (2015), Fournier 
and Scarsini (2014) consider Hotelling models on graphs studying some very 
interesting properties of the economic system at the firm-level. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first analysis of product complexity that places the spotlight to 
the consumers’ perspective, and treats complexity using the multiple characteristics of 
the products over which consumers have tastes. By doing so, we characterize product 
differentiation competition as adaptive learning by firms’ managers in a complex 
system with limited information feedback. The results reported in the subsequent 
sections are intended to demonstrate that such a complex systems approach provides a 
plausible basis for understanding market-share inequality and firms’ competition in the 
product-characteristics space and can advance the analysis of these topics in alternative 
ways. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced: the 
complexity of the market is described analytically by applying graph theory in 
networks. Section 3 gives the simulation strategy and discusses the simulation results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
  
2.  The market as a complex system 
Following the relevant literature (Potts, 2000; Schweitzer et al., 2009; Easley and 
Kleinberg, 2010; Jackson, 2010), at any point in time t , the market is represented by a 
graph of a set of consumers and a set of products/firms, tG , and the relationships 
between them represented in ( )t tl G  
 
 { , ( )}ts t t tE G l G=                                                                             (1) 
 
where 1{ : }
k g
t i i iG g g == ∈  is the set of economic agents on the product-characteristics 
space k  and ( ) { }t t ij tl G l=  is a g g×  matrix that summarizes the connections between 
the economic agents, where, if , ti j sl l E∈  denotes the existence of a connection between 
economic agents i  and j , then 
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In this system there are two subsets of economic agents, consumers, 
1{ : } t
Ck
t i i iC c c == ∈ , and  firms, 1{ : } t
Fk
t i i iF f f == ∈ . We consider tF  competing 
firms for which tF  different opinion networks exist. These opinion networks represent 
the different opinion exchange patterns of consumers for the different tF  firms. For 
example, two consumers may exchange their opinions for firm A but not for firm B, 
hence there is a link between them apparent in opinion network A but not in network 
B. Suppose that in every period each consumer i  is represented in each network and 
must make a decision on buying a product from a firm, hence to stay active in one of 
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the tF  opinion networks. For simplicity, let us assume ( ),i j t t i j tf f l G f f G∉ ∀ ∈ , thus 
omitting relationships between the different opinion networks.4 In this market, the 
earnings of firm j  immediately follow from the number of active consumers (nodes) 
in opinion network j  at the end of any given period t, since any active node in opinion 
network j  at the end of period t represents a purchase from firm j .5 Furthermore, the 
number of active nodes in each network is determined by the tastes and the choices of 
each of the consumers in the market and following Simon (1955) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) we explain below the process of these choices assuming bounded 
rationality.   
 
2.1 Consumers’ behavior 
Traditionally the assumed heuristic for consumers is a maximization rule over some 
utility function defined over the set of products’ quantities. However, this rule is 
inconsistent with extensive evidence presented in behavioral economics and marketing 
literature. Here we assume that each consumer’s preferences can be characterized by 
an ideal economic position in some k -dimensional product characteristics space, and 
we look closely on the decisions made by consumers when choosing which firm’s 
product to buy. Having switched from formal analysis to computation, we depart from 
the classical analytically tractable models first, by assuming as baseline decision rule 
that consumers are affected by the opinion of their peers and second, by making the 
appropriate behavioral assumptions following the relevant literature of behavioral 
economics, discussed below. 
Behavioral decision theory is psychological in its orientation, beginning with the view 
of humans as limited information processors or, perhaps more accurately, as 
“boundedly rational information processors” (Simon, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1959). 
Humans have developed a large number of cognitive mechanisms to cope with the 
overwhelming volume of information in the modern societies. These mechanisms are 
adopted automatically without any conscious and are cognitive shortcuts for making 
4 We assume that all consumers buy in the equilibrium (covered market is a quite standard assumption 
in the literature, e.g. Irmen and Thisse, 1998), where price is exogenously given. Firms do not compete 
on price but only on location. 
5 We assume that any product may be produced at the same constant marginal cost, which is normalized 
to zero without loss of generality. 
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certain judgments and inferences with considerably less alternatives than those dictated 
by rational choice, focusing attention on a small subset of all possible information.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1974, 1984) and Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974) 
have identified three general cognitive heuristics that decision makers adopt in the 
process of information gathering and analysis: (a) decomposition, which refers to 
braking a decision down into its component parts, each of which is presumably easier 
to evaluate than the entire decision; (b) editing or pruning, which refers to simplifying 
a decision by eliminating (ignoring) otherwise relevant aspects of the decision; (c) 
decision heuristics, which are simplifying the choice between alternatives thus 
providing cognitive efficiency.  
These heuristics have direct application to consumers’ choices. Consumers face a 
myriad of alternative products and there is compelling evidence which suggest that 
consumers simplify their decisions with a consider-then choose decision process in 
which they first identify a set of products, the consideration set, for further evaluation 
and then choose from the consideration set. In seminal observational research Payne 
(1976) identified that consumers use consider-then-choose decision processes. This 
heuristic is firmly rooted in both the experimental and prescriptive marketing literature 
(e.g. Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker, 1996; Brown and Wildt, 1992; DeSarbo et al., 
1996; Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Jedidi et al., 1996; Mehta et al., 2003; Montgomery 
and Svenson, 1976; Paulssen and Bagozzi, 2005; Roberts and Lattin, 1991; Shocker et 
al., 1991; Wu and Rangaswamy, 2003). 
In the context of our model, this means that the set of alternatives each consumer, i , 
considers, tiB , is a subset of the overall set of firms/products in the system. So we can 
define the consideration set for consumer i  as 
 
 { / } { / ( ) 1}t ti j t j i j t i j tB f F f c f F b f Fε= ∈ − ≤ = ∈ = ⊂                                  (3) 
             
where tib  is a mapping which assigns elements in the overall set of alternatives tF   to 
either the consideration set or not, so : {0,1}ti tb F → , such that ( ) 1ti jb f =  indicates that 
the firm/product j  is considered by consumer i . 
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 2.2 Consumers’ multilayered opinion networks 
At the beginning of time period t  we consider tF  networks, representing the 
consumers’ different opinion exchange patterns for the tF  competing firms. During 
the time period t , each consumer i  is represented in tiB  networks and can be active 
in any of these networks. In particular, ( ) 0ti jb f =  if consumer i  is inactive in network 
j  and  ( ) 1ti jb f =  if consumer i  is active in network j . At the end of time period t , 
the activity of a consumer in network j  corresponds to the consumer’s purchase of firm 
j  ‘s output, hence each consumer can be active only on one network on the purchase 
moment (i.e., if ( ) 1ti jb f =  then ( ) 0 for 
t
i mb f m j= ≠ ). Nevertheless we leave to the 
consumer the freedom not to make a purchase (i.e., 1 2( ) ( ) ... ( ) 0 t
i
t t t
i i i B
b f b f b f= = = = ). 
Moreover, consumers are influenced by their network peers, hence we assume that, on 
the purchase time, if the majority of consumer i ’s peers are active in network j , the 
consumer will be active in the same network j , provided that she is not already active 
in another network.  
Based on the above discussion, the t
i
B  mathematical constraints that consumer i  needs 
to satisfy at the end of the period time t  are: 
  
1( )
( ) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( )),      for     1, 2...
t
i
t
ij
B
tt t t
i j j i k i
kNb c
k j
b f b f b f j Bλ
λ =∈
≠
 
 = − − − =
  
∏ ∏      (4) 
 
where ( )
j
t
iNb c is consumer i ’s network of opinions about firm j . Though we assume 
no buyer’s remorse, we allow for some conflicts in the system before the purchase time, 
in the sense that the t
i
B  constraints provided by equations (4) will not be satisfied. The 
behavioral literature points out that consumers face an “uncertainty reduction” to the 
choice of the product they will purchase as the purchase time comes closer. The agents 
change and adapt their behavior over time, reflecting both their own learning and 
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changes in their environment. When they think of a purchase, initially they are more 
likely to change opinions and examine different options. They have some form of 
opinion at the beginning, but as they gain experience and acquire more information, 
their opinion changes and stabilizes over time (see Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999; West et 
al., 1996). This “uncertainty reduction” is captured by dynamics that slow down until 
the purchase time when they become completely frozen. These dynamics are 
implemented with the simulated annealing algorithm.  
 
2.3 Evolution dynamics during consumers’ purchasing process 
To model how consumers decide during the time period t  we consider the following 
equation (5) that counts the number of the constraints in equations (4) that are violated 
(Halu et al., 2013): 
 
 
2
1 1 1( )
( ) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( ))
tt
ii t
t
ij
BB C
t t t
i j j i k
j i kNb c
k j
H b f b f b fλ
λ= = =∈
≠
      = − − − −   
       
∑ ∑ ∏ ∏                  (5) 
 
Initially, active nodes in each network j  are distributed according to consumers’ 
consideration sets [equation (3)], and we allow the consumers to change opinion at any 
time before they make their final choice. These dynamics are implemented using the 
simulated annealing algorithm, which works as follows. Starting from a relatively high 
initial temperature,6 i.e. a large number of potential conflicts [a large-number of non-
binding constraints given by equations (4), hence a high H given by equation (5)] due 
to the stochastic way initial opinions are distributed, we use a Monte Carlo dynamics 
which will reach an equilibrium following the equation (5). As the time for the final 
choice approaches, the effective temperature decreases and the consumers tend to have 
less and less conflicts with their network peers until they reach  to zero conflicts at 
equilibrium, when 0H = . These dynamics are implemented using the simulated 
annealing algorithm.  
6 Since we start with a sufficiently high temperature, the dynamics are not affected by the initial 
conditions of the system. 
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At the end of the simulated annealing calculation we will have the configuration of the 
model for the period t , which is depicted in Figure 1. Hence, we will have “regions” in 
the average connectivity of consumers’ opinion networks space where the active nodes 
of some networks will percolate the economy, while the nodes of the remaining layers 
will be concentrated in disconnected clusters indicating high market share inequality 
(since the active nodes in each network represent the respective firm’s customers). 
Nevertheless, “regions” where the average connectivity of the opinion networks will be 
comparable manifest a market that sustains low market share inequality.7  
 
2.4 Firms’ ‘behavior’ 
Firms’ managers are assumed to use an adaptive decision rule to set product 
characteristics on a multidimensional product-characteristics space at any given period 
t . We assume an adaptive rule that models a manager who constantly modifies product 
characteristics in the search for more customers, and the manager cares only about the 
firm’s market share. If the manager’s decision for the characteristics of the product at 
time 𝑡𝑡 was rewarded by an increase in market share, then the firm makes a unit move 
at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 in the same direction as the move at 𝑡𝑡. If not, the manager reverses 
direction and makes a unit move on a heading randomly selected within the half-space 
being faced now. In other words, the firm’s manager relentlessly forages in the product-
characteristics space, always searching for more customers and never being satisfied, 
changing strategic planning in the same direction as long as this is rewarded with more 
sales, but casting around for a new strategic planning when the previous one was 
punished with falling or static sales. 
Now that we have structurally defined the evolution process of the complex system as 
a whole, we can proceed to simulations.  
  
7 These results arise intuitively -and are confirmed by our model- from the percolation theory on networks 
literature (see Newman, 2010) and the recent results concerning the role of densely connected social 
networks on the adoption of a behavior (see Centola, 2010).  
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Figure 1: Illustration of the system’s final configuration  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (Colored figure) Layer 1 represents consumers’ opinion network for firm B; Layer 3 represents 
consumers’ opinion network for firm A; Layer 2 is the (2-dimensional) product-characteristics plane; 
Each consumer is represented in all layers but can be active either in the firm B’s underlying opinion-
network (blue node) or in the firm A’s underlying opinion-network (red node) or inactive in both 
networks (white node). 
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Figure 2: Overview of the evolution of the system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SETUP 
Create consumers and firms 
Randomly (drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 
1 radius of space) assign 2-dimensional positions to all agents 
For each firm, setup a respective consumers’ opinion network that follows Poisson degree 
distribution 
 
PROCESS 
CONSUMERS ADAPT 
Setup 
Set up the consideration set for each consumer 
Process 
Start at temperature T =1 and minimize equation (5) 
using the simulated annealing algorithm 
 
Consumers’ final configuration 
0H =  (no conflicts in the system) 
SYSTEM UPDATE 
Count active nodes in each network 
 
FIRMS’ MANAGERS ADAPT 
 Was previous move followed by increased sales? If yes repeat move. 
If no, turn 180o from direction of last move and make unit move in direction 
randomly selected from arc 90o either side of direction now faced 
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3. Simulations 
For clarity in what follows we consider two firms, hence two layers in the consumers’ 
opinion network, in the simulation experiments. Though, our code can be 
straightforwardly generalized to consider multiple firms/networks. In our setting, 
consumers are assumed to be intrinsically interested in product characteristics and to 
have ideal points in a product-characteristics space (again, in order to aid visualization, 
the simulated version of the model is implemented in two dimensions, i.e. in the 
Euclidean plane, but the model can be implemented in any number of dimensions). 
Firms compete with each other by offering products with varied characteristics to 
consumers. Figure 2 summarizes the model and its evolution process, which was 
programmed in R.  
 
3.1 Firm System Dynamics 
Initiation of the model randomly distributes a discrete set of firms’ locations and 
consumers’ ideal points across the product-characteristics plane.8 Consumers are 
initially present and active in the opinion-networks/firms which lie within their 
consideration sets. As discussed above (see section 2.3),  we allow the consumers to 
change opinion at any time before they make their final choice, and we model their 
dynamics using the simulated annealing aiming to reduce to zero the number of 
conflicts with their network peers (the number of violated mathematical constraints 
given by equation (4) for all consumers) when reaching equilibrium. More precisely, 
the algorithm starts with an initial temperature 1T =  and at every time step we select a 
node at random from either one of the two networks with equal probability and we 
change it from active to inactive or vice versa. After this change, the equation (5) is 
recalculated, and if the difference with respect to its previous value, H∆ , is negative 
i.e., the number of conflicts in the system is reduced, the change is accepted. If 0H∆ >
, the change can still be accepted but with a small probability given by e-ΔΗ/kT. This 
random selection process is repeated 2N time steps, in order to update the whole system 
on average once and then we advance the system time by one Monte Carlo step. The 
whole process is repeated by slowly reducing the temperature until we reach 
8 We assign 2-dimensional positions to all agents, drawn from a bivariate random normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation one radius of space. 
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equilibrium at 0H = , where there are no more conflicts in the network. The final 
configuration of the “uncertainty reduction” process just described is depicted in Figure 
1. 
We assume that consumers can share opinions with others randomly, therefore the 
consumers’ opinion networks follow Poisson degree distributions, i.e. they fall in the 
class of Erdos-Renyi random networks (in the top panel of Figure 3 we illustrate how 
these networks look like for different average degrees). Using average degrees above 
the percolation threshold, we visualize the evolution of the giant component against the 
average degree of the network (see Newman, 2010). In the bottom panel of Figure 3 
the final configuration of the two-firm model for different average-degrees of 
consumers’ opinion networks is shown. In particular we contour-plot the difference 
between the total number of customers of firm A (total number of nodes active in 
network A) and the total number of customers of firm B (total number of nodes active 
in network B) as a function of the average connectivities of the two networks, Ak  and 
B
k  respectively.9  
The simulation results visualized in Figure 3 disclose the following three cases that 
appear in our model: 
- Case 1: In the regions where the mean degree of both networks is smaller than 
one, there are no giant components in the networks. This means that the 
networks are fragmented and the opinion of a consumer is not affected by peer 
opinions. In this case each firm possesses only a marginal market share and 
noticeable market share inequality is unlikely.  
- Case 2: In the regions where the mean degree of either one of the two networks 
is smaller than one and for the other network bigger than one, the giant 
component in the latter network emerges and market share inequality occurs. 
- Case 3: In the regions where the mean degree of both networks is greater than 
one, giant components emerge in both networks. In these regions we have the 
pluralism solution of the consumers’ choices and hence, no noticeable market 
share inequality is apparent. 
9 For all the experiments we pin down consideration set’s radius, at 0.7ε = . We have also simulated 
the model with different values of ε  obtaining similar results. 
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Figure 3: The difference between the total number of firm A’s customers and the 
total number of firm B’s customers as a function of the two underlying opinion 
networks’ average connectivities, Ak  and Bk . 
 
 
Notes: (Colored figure) Top panel: Examples of Erdos Renyi networks with 500 nodes and different 
average degrees k . Note that while the first graph is at the percolation threshold and the largest cluster 
has already emerged, the graph is still very sparse. Bottom panel: The contour plot for the excess number 
of customers of firm A over firm B, sA-sB, for a system of 500 customers that evolved for 1000 steps. 
The underlying social networks are Erdos-Renyi random graphs with average degrees k  as shown in 
the axis of the figure. The results are averages of 100 realizations. Consumers’ consideration sets’ radius 
is pinned down at 0.7ε = . 
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It is clear from Figure 3 that the larger the difference in average degrees of the two 
networks, the larger the advantage of the firm with the more opinion-based connected 
consumers. Overall, Figure 3 and the above cases imply that the firm with the most 
connected customers gets the lion’s share of the market.  
Once consumers have purchased products, firms’ managers adapt their locations to 
reflect the pattern of consumers’ preferences. Firms’ managers are assumed to use an 
“unconstrained” adaptive rule that constantly modifies product characteristics in the 
search for more customers. The rule searches for customers using a “win-stay, lose-
shift” algorithm (Nowak and Sigmund,1993; Bendor  et al., 2003; Laver, 2005): if the 
previous move increased market share the manager makes another unit move in the 
same direction. If the previous move did not increase market share, the manager makes 
a unit random move in the opposite direction chosen randomly within the half space 
toward which it now faces.10 Managers use no information whatsoever about the global 
geography of the product-characteristics plane. They have no knowledge of the ideal 
point of any consumer but applying recursively the limited feedback from their local 
environment they pick up effective clues about the best direction in which to move.   
Once firms’ managers have adapted firms’ positions, consumers readapt and once more 
are active in the opinion-networks/firms which lie inside their consideration sets. Then 
they are again affected by peers’ opinions till their final decision on which product to 
purchase, then firms readapt to the new configuration of consumers’ preferences and 
the process iterates continuously.  
 
3.2 Location choice 
In the previous section we analyzed consumers’ behavior when their opinions are 
affected by the opinions of their network peers and the effect of this process in firms’ 
market share. Next, we consider firms’ location choice on the product-characteristics 
plane with origin (0,0) assuming that consumer ideal points’ distribution is normal on 
both product-characteristics’ dimensions.11 We check whether certain product 
differentiation patterns emerge.  
10 The manager makes a unit move in a random direction on the first iteration.  
11 Bivariate random normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one radius of space. 
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 Figure 4: The average distance d  of the two firms ( ,A B ) from the origin of the 
product-characteristics plane (0,0), as a function of the logarithms of the 
underlying opinion-networks’ average degrees, Ak  and Bk . 
 
 
 
Notes: (Colored figure) The system consists of 500 consumers whose ideal points/tastes for product-
characteristics are distributed following the bivariate (0,1)N . The distance d  is calculated at the end 
of a 1000 step trajectory, and each point is averaged from 100 realizations. The shaded area around the 
curves represents the standard error in the calculation of the mean value. Consumers’ consideration sets’ 
radius is pinned down at 0.7ε = . 
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Figure 4 summarizes the results of a simulation involving 100 independent 1000-cycle 
runs of the system with two firms (A and B) and 500 consumers. To avoid any 
dependence from the initial configuration we discard output from the first 150 cycles 
of each run, before the 1000 cycles were recorded. Figure 4 shows the average distance 
d  of the two firms from the origin of the product-characteristics plane (0,0) 
calculated at the end of a 1000 step trajectory, and each point is averaged for the 100 
realizations. The shaded area around the curves represents the standard error in the 
calculation of the mean value. For each panel we fix the average degree of the 
underlying opinion-network of one firm to either a very large or a very low value, and 
we measure d  as a function of the average degree of the other opinion-network/firm.  
From the left panels we see that, despite some fluctuations, the firms are moving closer 
to the center of the plane when both their underlying opinion-networks have relatively 
small average degrees, but when the average degree of only one of the two networks 
increases enough ( 100k > ), the corresponding firm moves away from the center 
while the other firm still moves towards the center of the plane. The right panels 
represent the reverse behavior; if one firm has an underlying opinion-network with 
large average degree and the other one with low, we find again that the one with the 
high degree roams anywhere in the product-characteristics plane, on average further 
away from the center than its competitor. On the other hand, the firm with the small 
average degree network stays close to the center in order to keep its consumers. 
However, by keeping fixed the large average degree and allowing the small average 
degree to increase, we observe that the firm which corresponds to the fixed degree 
systematically moves toward the center of the product-characteristics plane as the 
average degree of the network of its competitor increases, and when the average degrees 
are comparable, the two firms move at similar distances from the center. 
Summarizing, Figure 4 discloses the following scenarios for the different phases of the 
model: 
- Scenario I: A Bk k . In this case, firm B  moves toward the center of the 
product-characteristics plane searching for customers while the firm A  with 
better connected consumers can afford to roam anywhere in the product 
characteristics plane. 
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- Scenario II: A Bk k≈ . In this case, no firm has a significant advantage over 
its competitor due to the presence of the opinion-network. Therefore, very much 
along the lines predicted by the traditional spatial competition model, both firms 
systematically move toward the center of the product-characteristics plane. 
- Scenario III: A Bk k . In this case, it is firm B  that can afford to roam 
anywhere in the product-characteristics plane when the firm A  with the poorly 
connected underlying opinion-network is hunting customers moving towards 
the highest density of consumers. 
 
Constructively, the different phases of the model show that for the case of strong 
inequality in the density of firms’ underlying opinion-networks, the firm with the highly 
connected network is roaming anywhere in the product-characteristics plane away from 
its origin, despite the fact that this is the location of the highest density of consumers. 
The opposite is true, with the firms approaching the center more often, when their 
underlying networks are weak. The behavior behind this pattern is easily understood if 
the system is watched in motion (see supplementary videos). Firms’ locational moves 
have no effect in attracting consumers since the result of the maneuver is overshadowed 
by the effect of the network (the existence of links-connections between the 
consumers). On the other hand, the absence of opinion- networks reproduces the pattern 
observed in many simulations of two-party systems where the agents search for votes 
in the location of the highest vote densities. However, when there is no network-
inequality apparent, firms go up against in attracting every single potential client, both 
moving toward the highest density location of consumers. In this case, the two firms go 
to the center of the plane (0,0) and attack each other’s customer bases repelling one 
another from the dead center, along the lines predicted by the traditional spatial 
competition model.  
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Figure 5: Trajectory of the system with two firms ( ,A B ) for different pairs of 
average degrees, Ak  and Bk  for the respective underlying opinion-
networks. 
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For clarity, Figure 5 shows the trajectory of the simulated system with two firms (A and 
B), each artificially started at the edges of the product-characteristics plane, (−1,−1) 
and (1,1), with 500 uniformly randomly scattered consumers, for different -
representative for the three phases of the model- pairs of average degrees for the 
underlying networks: 400, 2;  2, 400;  2A B A B A Bk k k k k k= = = = = = . The 
first panel shows firm B’s manager systematically moving toward the location of the 
highest consumer densities, while firm A’s manager enjoys the support of her 
customers’ opinion-network and relentlessly zigzags anywhere in the product-
characteristics plane in a highly atypical way. The opposite pattern is apparent in the 
middle panel, while the bottom panel depicts the traditional spatial model, where the 
two firms go to the center of the plane and attack each others’ customer bases head to 
head.  
  
4. Conclusions 
In conclusion, we have put forth a product-characteristics competition spatial model 
based on complex systems science. Moving away from the forward-thinking strategic 
game theoretic models, we have argued that consumers’ boundedly rational behavior 
within their opinion exchange networks can result in concentrated power nodes in the 
network structure of the market. We have pointed out that the key feature to get the 
higher share of the overall product-purchases is the connectivity of the consumers’ 
opinion networks corresponding to different firms.  Regarding firms’ location, we use 
agent-based modeling to study multi-characteristics competition in the evolving 
market. We are interested in location competition among multiple firms in a 
multidimensional product-characteristics environment in which consumers and firms 
care more than one product characteristic. Though we miss the analytical tractability of 
the relevant theoretical models, our simulated results demonstrate the feasibility of 
agent-based techniques to describe and explore firms’ locational choices, as well as the 
capability of the proposed model to further advance the analysis in alternative ways.  
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